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Public Trials and a First
Amendment Right of Access: A
Presumption of Openness
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814
(1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment1 freedoms of speech and press, and the
sixth amendment2 right to a fair trial are considered to occupy a
special place in the constitutional hierarchy.3 When these rights
collide, rarely is the resulting fair trial-free press conflict easily re-
solved.4 In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,5 the Supreme Court added
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
The first amendment is made applicable to the states by section one of the
fourteenth amendment, which reads, in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immuniites of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
The sixth amendment is made applicable to the states by section one of the
fourteenth amendment. The due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment has special application in providing for the right to a fair trial. See
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
3. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
4. For a discussion of the fair trial-free press conflict, see § 131-A of text infra.
5. 443 U.S. 368 (1979). For a discussion of Gannett, see § HI-C of text infra.
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one more facet to the conflict by holding that the sixth amendment
right to a public trial was personal to the accused, and that the
public trial right did not confer upon the public a right of access to
pretrial suppression hearings. The Court's ambiguous opinion was
viewed by some lower courts as allowing the closure of criminal
trials, as well as pretrial suppression hearings.
6
In order to "wash away at least some of the graffiti that marred"
Gannett,7 the Court agreed to hear Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia8 and held that trials are presumptively open to the pub-
lic. In reaching its decision, the Court recognized a first amend-
ment public right of access to governmental institutions and
information. This note will analyze Richmond, focusing on its
precedential bases, its qualification of Gannett, and on the source
and scope of the newly recognized public right to access.
H. THE FACTS
In July, 1976, John Paul Stevenson, a Baltimore man,9 was con-
victed of second degree murder 10 in the Circuit Court of Hanover
County, Virginia for the 1975 stabbing death of a Hanover County
hotel manager." However, in October, 1977, the Virginia Supreme
Court found that a bloodstained shirt, purportedly belonging to
Stevenson, had been improperly admitted into evidence.12 Conse-
quently, the conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded
to the circuit court.13 Two subsequent attempts to try Stevenson
were no more successful. The second ended in a mistrial in May,
1978, when a juror was excused because of illness. 14 In June, 1978,
a third trial also ended in a mistrial because a prospective juror
had been influenced by the publicity surrounding the case and, in
turn, may have influenced other jurors.
15
At the beginning of the fourth trial in September, 1978, counsel
for the defendant entered a motion to close the trial to the public.
16
6. See notes 112-13 & accompanying text infra.
7. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2841 (1980) (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
8. 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
9. THE NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Aug.-Sept. 1980, at 2.
10. 100 S. Ct. at 2818.
11. Id.; THE NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Aug.-Sept. 1980, at 2.
12. Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, 237 S.E.2d 779 (1977).
13. Id.
14. 100 S. Ct. at 2818.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2819. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 5 MEDIA L. REP. 1545
(1979) (full transcript of the subsequent hearing on the closure order); THE
NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Aug-Sept. 1980, at 2.
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The prosecutor had no objection. The court granted the motion
without a hearing, and ordered17 that the courtroom be kept clear
of all parties except the witnesses when testifying,18 thus planting
the seed that became Richmond. Appellants Timothy Wheeler
and Kevin McCarthy, reporters for appellant Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc., were present during the closure motion but apparently
registered no objection at that time. However, later that same day
they sought and received a hearing on a motion to vacate the or-
der.19
Counsel for the appellants20 argued, first, that the closure order
was, in substance, the equivalent of a prior restraint and, as a re-
sult, the appellants' first amendment rights had been infringed.2 1
Secondly, counsel argued that the defendant's sixth amendment
right to a fair trial must be balanced against the public's interest in
open criminal proceedings "to ensure that the integrity of the judi-
cial process remains intact. '22 Finally, it was argued that before
the court could issue a closure order it was constitutionally man-
dated to consider other less drastic means of protecting the de-
fendant's fair trial right, such as sequestration of the jury.2 3
On the other hand, Stevenson's counsel described the problems
that had been encountered in trying the defendant in a small town
where it was difficult to impanel and maintain an impartial jury.24
He argued that Stevenson's right to a fair trial superseded all other
rights and that it was the court's responsibility to insure that
right.25 The court denied the motion to vacate the order and stated
that in any balancing of rights, the fair trial right of the defendant
must be given the greater weight. 26 The trial resumed the next day
17. The order was presumably under the authority of VA. CODE § 19.2-266 (1950),
which provides in part:
In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or
misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the
trial any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair
trial, provided that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not
be violated.
18. 100 S. Ct. at 2819.
19. Id.
20. Appellants Wheeler and McCarthy were also excluded from the hearing on
the motion to vacate the closure order. The court concluded that the hearing
was to be treated as part of the original trial and, therefore, subject to the
closure order. 5 MEDIA L. REP. at 1546.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1547.
23. Id.; 100 S. Ct. at 2819. In making this argument counsel for the appellants
cited Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). For a discussion of
Nebraska Press, see notes 55-66 & accompanying text infra.
24. 100 S. Ct. at 2819; 5 MEDIA L. REP. at 1548.
25. 5 MEDIA L. REP. at 1548.
26. The trial judge concluded by stating.
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with the public excluded. At the conclusion of the Common-
wealth's evidence, the court granted the defense counsel's motion
to dismiss the case because of insufficient evidence, and found Ste-
venson not guilty.
27
In September, 1978, immediately following the day-long trial,
the appellants petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court for writs of
mandamus and prohibition, and filed an appeal from the closure
order. The court dismissed the mandamus and prohibition peti-
tions, 2 8 and, finding no reversible error, denied the petition for ap-.
peal, citing Gannett.2 9 Appellants next sought review by the
United States Supreme Court. The Court granted review under its
certiorari jurisdiction 30 and then reversed the decision of the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court.
III. THE PRECEDENTIAL BASES
Richmond and Gannett both address the question of whether
there is a public right of access to judicial proceedings. Viewed in
this light, they represent the convergence of two lines of Supreme
Court decisions. The first line is made up of those decisions which
have involved the recurring conflict between the first and sixth
amendments-commonly called the fair trial-free press conflict.
31
In the second line are those cases which have wrestled with the
I'm inclined to agree with [defense counsel] that, if I feel that the
rights of the defendant are infringed in any way, [when] he makes
the motion to do something and it doesn't completely override all
rights of everyone else, then I'm inclined to go along with the defend-
ant's motion.
Id. at 1548-49. The court also commented that the layout of the courtroom
played a part in its decision in that it was "distracting" to the jury. "When we
get into our new Court Building people can sit in the audience so the jury
can't see them. The rule of the Court may be different under those circum-
stances. . . ." Id. at 1548.
After ruling against the motion to vacate the closure order, the court dis-
cussed whether it should "put a gag rule" on the counsel for the appellants to
prevent him from divulging any information about the hearing to his clients.
The court concluded that such a gag order would be purposeless because if
the appellants are not allowed into court the next day, they will know what
occurred in the hearing. Id. at 1549.
27. 100 S. Ct. at 2820; THE NEWS MEDIA & THE LAw, Aug.-Sept. 1980, at 2.
28. 100 S. Ct. at 2820.
29. Id.; THE NEWS MEDIA & THE LAw, Aug.-Sept. 1980, at 2.
30. The appellants sought review in the United States Supreme Court under
both appellate and certiorari jurisdiction. However, appellate jurisdiction
was denied because the appellants had not explicitly challenged the validity
of the closure statute, VA. CODE § 19.2-266 (1950), in the state courts. 100 S. Ct.
at 2820 n.4.
31. See generally Stephenson, Fair Trial-Free Press: Rights in Continuing Con-
flict, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 39 (1979); Wright, Fair Trial-Free Press, 38 F.R.D.
435 (1965).
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question of a public right of access to governmental institutions
and information. In order to properly analyze the Richmond deci-
sion and gauge its legal impact, it is first necessary to examine
these two lines of constitutional thought.32
A. The Fair Trial-Free Press Conflict
The conflicting functions of the first and sixth amendments
often result in an adversary relationship.33 The difficulty of resolv-
ing this conflict is increased because the freedom of speech and
press, and the right to a fair trial are said to occupy preferred posi-
tions in a constitutional hierarchy.34 As Justice Black stated, "free
32. While a brief discussion of the fair trial-free press conflict and the public right
of access serves as a background for a study of the Richmond decision, a
more comprehensive analysis of either line of cases is beyond the scope of
this note. The two issues have been the subjects of a voluminous amount of
material. For a discussion of the fair trial-free press conflict, see Kaplan, Free
Press/Fair Trial Rights in Conflict Freedom of the Press and the Rights of the
Individual, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 361 (1976); Stephenson, supra note 31; Wright,
supra note 31; Note, The Free Press-Fair Trial Dilemma: New Dimensions in
a Continuing Struggle, 6 HoFSmTA L REV. 1013 (1978). For a discussion of the
question of a public right of access, see Note, The Right of the Press to Gather
Information, 71 CoLUm. L. REv. 838 (1971); Note, The Rights of the Public and
the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1505 (1974); Note, The Con-
stitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977).
33. Although still adversarial, the relationship has sometimes been viewed as
symbiotic. For example, in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), the
Supreme Court observed:
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its
function in this regard is documented by an impressive record of
service over several centuries. The press does not simply publish in-
formation about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice
by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to exten-
sive public scrutiny and criticism.
Id. at 350.
34. The principle that the rights enumerated by the Bill of Rights occupy a pre-
ferred position was first announced by the Court in United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), where Justice Stone stated: 'There may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Consti-
tution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." Id. at 152 nA (ci-
tations omitted).
A few years later the "preferred position" language was applied explicitly
to the freedoms of press, speech and religion in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 115 (1943). Although not the subject of a specific decision, the Court
has implicitly recognized the right to a fair trial as a fundamental right. Cf.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right of an indigent to counsel).
Justice Frankfurter criticized the use of the "preferred position" terminology
in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For a
more detailed discussion of the first amendment as a preferred right, see Van
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speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our
civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose between
them."
35
It has been suggested that the conflict was either planned by
the framers of the Constitution or, at least, represented such a nat-
ural and inherent tension that its constitutional resolution was not
possible.36 Nevertheless, whatever the source of the conflict, it has
often been the responsibility of the Supreme Court to make a
choice between a commitment to an "uninhibited, robust, and wide
open"37 debate of public issues, and a commitment to a criminal
process in which "conclusions . . . reached in a case will be in-
duced only by evidence and argument in open court. '38 The
Court's decisions have done little to settle the conflict and have,
instead, resulted in a state of law which resembles an ill-defined
and often-violated truce.
The fair trial-free press conflict cases are connected by a com-
mon concern that publicity may endanger the defendant's sixth
amendment right to a fair trial.3 9 The question usually arises
within the context of pretrial publicity and its effect on the imparti-
ality of potential jurors. In this context, the concern is that jurors
or potential jurors will be prejudiced by pretrial publicity and will
be unable to render an impartial verdict based only on the evi-
dence presented at trial.40 However, both publicity during the
Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a "Preferred Position, "28 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 761 (1977).
35. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
36. "[I]f the authors of these guarantees, fully aware of the potential conflicts
between them, were unwilling or unable to resolve the issue by assigning to
one priority over the other, it is not for us to rewrite the Constitution by un-
dertaking what they declined to do." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 561 (1976).
37. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
38. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
39. It is unclear whether publicity really does have a prejudicial effect on jurors
and potential jurors. Results of a number of empirical studies of the problem
do not dictate the conclusion that no prejudice results from publication. See
Kline & Jess, Prejudicial Publicity: Its Effect on Law School Mock Juries, 43
JOURNALuSM Q. 113 (1966); Riley, Pretrial Publicity: A Field Study, 50 JoUR-
NALISM Q. 17 (1973); Simon, Murder, Juries, and the Press, TRANs-AcTiON,
May-June 1966, at 40; Tans & Chaffee, Pretrial Publicity and Juror Prejudice,
43 JOURNALiSM Q. 647 (1966). For a general discussion of the problem, see
Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decision-
making, 86 HARv. L. REV. 386 (1972); Comment, Fair Trial v. Free Press: The
Psychological Effect of Pre-Trial Publicity on the Juror's Ability to be Impar-
tial; A Plea for Reform, 38 S. CAL I REV. 672 (1965).
40. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). In Irvin, the Supreme Court also noted
that "the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or inno-
cence of an accused, without more, [is not sufficient to] rebut the presump-
[Vol. 60:169
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trial4 ' and methods of news gathering at trial42 have been found to
have a prejudicial effect on the defendant's right to a fair trial.
The Supreme Court's current interest in the problems
presented by publicity began in 1950.43 Since then, the Court has
reversed or set aside a number of criminal convictions which possi-
bly were tainted by prejudicial publicity.4 Thus, a trial judge who
is presented with a question of prejudicial publicity will find him-
self within the eye of the fair trial-free press hurricane. An im-
proper balancing of first and sixth amendment rights can sweep
his decision into reversal. In achieving a proper constitutional bal-
ance, three questions must be asked:45 (1) How far must the trial
court go in order to protect the defendant's fair trial rights? (2)
What procedures are available to neutralize the effect of the preju-
dicial publicity? (3) How far can the trial court go in protecting the
defendant's fair trial right without infringing on the first amend-
ment freedoms of the press and public?
In Sheppard v. Maxwell,46 the Supreme Court attempted to an-
swer the first two questions. Dr. Sam Sheppard was convicted of
murdering his wife after a trial which the Court described as hav-
ing a "carnival atmosphere." 47  The murder apparently had
tion of a prospective juror's impartiality .... ." [To require complete
impartiality] would be to establish an impossible standard." Id. at 723.
41. E.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). It should be noted that in Rich-
mond it was the fear of the effect of prejudicial publicity during trial which
motivated the closure order. See note 24 & accompanying text supra.
42. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965). In Estes, the Court held, in a five-to-four decision, that the presence of
television cameras in the courtroom to record the trial proceedings for later
broadcast was deemed to have prejudiced the defendant's fair trial right. The
Court stated: "It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process
deprivations we require a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused.
Nevertheless, at times a procedure employed by the State involves such a
probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in
due process." Id. at 542-43.
43. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950). In Baltimore
Radio, Justice Frankfurter filed a separate opinion to the Court's denial of
certiorari to comment on the presence of pretrial publicity in the case.
44. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Shepherd v. Florida, 341
U.S. 50 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
45. As part of the analysis, the trial judge will also want to pinpoint the type of
publicity in question (pretrial, during trial, or methods of news gathering) in
order to determine the protective procedures that are available and that
might be effective.
46. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). For a more detailed discussion of Sheppard, see Note,
Prejudicial Publicity in Criminal Proceedings, 45 N.C. L REV. 183 (1966);
Note, Sheppard v. Maxwell-Duty of Trial Judge to Protect Accused From
Prejudice, 62 Nw. U. L. REv. 89 (1967).
47. 384 U.S. at 358. The Court described the situation, stating-
The fact is that bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and
1981]
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shocked the community and, as a result, Sheppard's conviction
was marred by all three types of prejudicial publicity (i.e., pretrial,
during trial, and methods of news gathering).
In reversing Sheppard's conviction, the Supreme Court held
that the trial judge had failed to properly protect the defendant,
jurors, and witnesses from the intensity of publicity.48 The Court
stated that the trial judge had at his disposal more than adequate
procedural safeguards to protect the defendant's fair trial right.
49
These procedures included: (1) intensive voir dire examination to
assure the presumption of juror impartiality had not been eroded
by pretrial publicity; (2) sequestration of the jury; (3) control of
members of the press within the courtroom by limiting their
number and controlling their conduct; (4) proscribing extrajudicial
statements by police, witnesses, court officials and counsel;
5 0 (5)
continuance; and (6) change of venue. In conclusion, the Court
stated that "reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those re-
medial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception."
5 '
In the subsequent ten years, the Sheppard mandate that "[t] he
courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect
their processes from prejudicial outside interferences '5 2 was
heartily followed by trial courts.5 3 Trial judges made increasing
use of protective orders to neutralize the effect of prejudicial pub-
newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most
of the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard .... Having as-
signed almost all of the available seats in the courtroom to the news
media the judge lost his ability to supervise that environment. The
movement of the reporters in and out of the courtroom caused fre-
quent confusion and disruption of the trial.
Id. at 355.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 357-63.
50. The Supreme Court affirmed the power of trial judges to restrain statements
by counsel, court officials, witnesses and defendants in Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976); id. at 601 n.27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
However, a criminal defendant may have a strong interest in gaining media
attention to counteract the stigma of guilt produced by a criminal charge. "A
bare denial and a possible reminder that a charged person is presumed to be
innocent until proved guilty is often insufficient to balance the scales." Chi-
cago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). As a result, the propriety of orders restraining
statements by a defendant and his counsel is subject to question. See Note,
Silence Orders--Preserving Political Expression by Defendants and their
Lawyers, 6 Haiv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 595 (1971).
51. 384 U.S. at 363.
52. Id.
53. For a discussion of protective orders prior to Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539 (1976), see Landau, Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due Process
Proposal-The Challenge of the Communications Media, 62 A.BA J. 55
(1976); Roney, The Bar Answers the Challenge, 62 A.B. J. 60 (1976); Com-
ment, Sequestration: A Possible Solution to the Free Press-Fair Trial Di-
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licity on the defendant's fair trial right. However, during that pe-
riod the constitutional outer limits of the protective order
remained undefined.5 4 The Supreme Court had not yet answered
the question of how far a protective order could reach before it in-
fringed upon the first amendment freedoms of the press and pub-
lic.
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart5 5 represented the first
time the Supreme Court squarely confronted the conflict between
the first and sixth amendments.5 6 In Nebraska Press, the Court ex-
amined the constitutionality of a protective order which prohibited
the press from publishing the existence or nature of any confes-
sions or other facts "strongly implicative" of an accused mass mur-
derer.5 7 The order was to stay in effect until the jury was
impaneled.5 8 The crime, which occurred in the small town of Suth-
erland, Nebraska, soon drew nationwide publicity.
5 9
The Court unanimously held the order invalid. The opinion of
the Court,6 0 written by Chief Justice Burger, characterized the or-
der as a prior restraint,6 ' which is "the most serious and the least
tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights."62 While stat-
ing that a prior restraint only postpones publication, the Chief Jus-
tice recognized that such a postponement can destroy the
timeliness required by the news media, and, in essence, freezes
first amendment freedoms at least for the time.
63
In determining the validity of the order, the Chief Justice
lemma, 23 AM. U. L. REV. 923 (1974); Comment, Gagging the Press in Criminal
Trials, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 608 (1975).
54. E.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301, 1308
(1974).
55. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). For a more detailed discussion of Nebraska Press, see
Symposium-Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 383
(1977); Larson, Free Press v. Fair Trial in Nebraska: A Position Paper, 55
NEB. L. REv. 543 (1976).
56. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTONAL LAw 625 (1978).
57. 427 U.S. at 541.
58. Id. at 543.
59. Id. at 542.
60. The decision consisted of five separate opinions. Justices White, Blackmun,
Powell and Rehnquist joined the Chief Justice in the majority opinion. Jus-
tice Brennan (joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall) and Justices White,
Powell, and Stevens all wrote separate concurring opinions.
61. Basically, a prior restraint is a governmental order which restricts or pro-
hibits speech prior to its publication. For a discussion of prior restraints,
remedies to prior restraints, and prior restraints as distinguished from subse-
quent punishments, see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRES-
SION 503-12 (1970); J. NOWAX, R. ROTUINDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
741-48 (1978); L. TRIBE, supra note 56, at 724-32; Monaghan, First Amendment
Due Process, 83 HARv. L. REV. 518, 543-44 (1970).
62. 427 U.S. at 559.
63. Id. at 559-61.
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presented a test which, within the context of the evidence before
the trial judge, examined: "(a) the nature and extent of pretrial
news coverage; (b) whether other measures would be likely to mit-
igate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c) how
effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the
threatened danger."
64
While not foreclosing the possibility that circumstances could
occur which would justify a prior restraint, the Chief Justice em-
phasized that "the barriers to prior restraint remain high and the
presumption against its use continues intact."65 Despite the Chief
Justice' statement that prior restraints could conceivably be con-
stitutionally acceptable, it has been suggested that Nebraska Press
implicitly holds that "prior orders restraining the publication of
news prejudicial to a criminal defendant are never permissible."66
The combination of Sheppard and Nebraska Press help to de-
64. Id. at 562.
65. Id. at 570.
66. L. TmBE, supra note 56, at 627. In coming to this conclusion, Professor Tribe
reasoned that:
Given the inevitably speculative nature of any "finding" that such al-
ternatives would have failed, the Court's admonition must mean that
the alternatives must at least be tried before a restraint on publica-
tion may issue. And the Supreme Court's apparent confidence that
the alternatives would prove adequate suggests that the Court has
gone further and announced a virtual bar to prior restraints on re-
porting of news about crime.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See Prettyman, Nebraska Press Association v. Stu-
art: Have We Seen the Last of Prior Restraints on the Reporting of Judicial
Proceedings?, 20 ST. Louis U. L.J. 654 (1976).
A careful reading of the separate opinions in Nebraska Press reveals that
in the future, there may be five Justices willing to hold that prior restraints
directed at the publication of news prejudicial to a criminal defendant are
never permissible. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Mar-
shall, took an absolutist position that "prior restraints on the freedom of
the press is a constitutionally impermissible method for enforcing" the de-
fendant's fair trial right. 427 U.S. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by
Stewart, J. & Marshall, J.). Justice Stevens generally subscribed to Justice
Brennan's views. Id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring). And Justice White,
although joining Chief Justice Burger's opinion, emphasized that he had a
"grave doubt ... whether orders with respect to the press such as were enter-
ed in this case would ever be justifiable." Id. at 570-71 (White, J., concurring).
See L. TRBE, supra note 56, at 627 n.25.
Justice Brennan listed several "practical reasons" supporting his position
against a system which would allow the use of prior restraints. Id. at 604-09
(Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Stewart, J. & Marshall, J.). First, such a
system would place judges "into censorship roles that are simply inappropri-
ate and impermissible under the First Amendment." Id. at 607. Second, in
such a role, judges might be inclined to restrain publication of information
which reflected on "their competence, integrity, or general performance on
the bench." Id. Third, prior restraints are difficult to challenge, and that
could lead to overuse. Id. at 607-08. Finally, the burden to challenge prior
[Vol. 60:169
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fine the responsibilities and limitations imposed upon a trial judge
in dealing with a fair trial-free press conflict. However, the fair
trial-free press cases do not provide a complete basis for the exam-
ination of a closure order.67 Although a closure order arises within
the context of the conflict, the real substance of the closure prob-
lem lies within the Court's "right of access" decisions.
B. A Question of Access
The Court has discussed the existence of a right of access in at
least three different theoretical contexts. First, "right of access"
has been used to describe a right to receive information from a
willing source. 68 Secondly, the phrase has been defined as a right
of access to a forum in order to transmit a message.69 Finally,
"right of access," as discussed in Gannett and Richmond, has been
used to describe a right to gather information, particularly from a
governmental source.
Much of the present controversy concerning the existence of a
public right of access to governmental institutions or processes be-
gan with Branzburg v. Hayes.70 The Court in Branzburg rejected
the claim of a reporter's privilege to protect confidential sources
and held that "newsmen are not exempt from the normal duty of
appearing before a grand jury and answering questions relevant to
a criminal investigation."71 In support of the principle that the
restraints would be on the press. Because of the difficulty involved, many
improper prior restraints would go unchallenged. Id. at 610-11.
It is arguable that all of Justice Brennan's practical arguments against
prior restraints could also apply to court closures.
67. For a discussion distinguishing prior restraints from closure orders, see § IV-
A of text infra.
68. "It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, es-
thetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here." Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969). See also Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (the Court
held unconstitutional a statute permitting the government to require that the
addressee of unrequested "communist political propaganda" affirmatively re-
quest postal delivery in writing).
69. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S.
367 (1969), where the Court upheld the Federal Communications Commis-
sion's "fairness doctrine" which requires broadcasters to allow time to reply
to personal attacks and political editorials. But see Miami Herald Publishing
Co., Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), where the Court struck down a state
statute that required newspaper publishers to allow free reply space to politi-
cal candidates that they had attacked in the newspaper.
70. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). For a more in-depth discussion of Branzburg, see Com-
ment, Has Branzburg Buried the Underground Press?, 8 H~Av. C.R-C.L L.
REV. 181 (1973); Note, No Testimonial Privilege for Newsmen, 51 N.C. L REV.
562 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 137 (1972).
71. 408 U.S. at 685.
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press and the public are equal under the law,72 the Court noted
that "the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a consti-
tutional right of special access to information not available to the
public generally."73 Finally, in what appeared to be an offhand and
contradictory remark, the Court added that "news gathering is not
without its First Amendment protections .... "74
The precise holding of Branzburg, which rejected a testimonial
privilege for reporters, has been substantially eroded by subse-
quent lower court decisions7 5 and state shield laws.76 Moreover,
although the case did not squarely address the question of a public
right of access to governmental institutions and processes, its as-
sertions have fueled the continued debate over the existence of the
right. Those assertions were that: (1) the press and public are
equal; (2) the first amendment does not guarantee the press a con-
stitutional right of access to information not available to the public;
and (3) news gathering may be subject to some first amendment
protection.
72. In terms of a theory of the first amendment, there is sound reasoning for the
principle that the press and public are equal. To do otherwise would force
the development of arbitrary distinctions which could eventually result in
different degrees of first amendment rights for the metropolitan newspaper
publisher and for the lonely pamphleteer. See id. at 704.
However, for a particularly offensive application of this principle, see
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), where the Supreme Court held
that the first and fourth amendments permit searches of press offices pursu-
ant to a valid warrant and do not require use of the less intrusive subpoena
duces tecum where practicable. In Zurcher, the newspaper was not sus-
pected of committing a crime, but of having within its possession photo-
graphic evidence of the identity of demonstrators who had beaten police
officers. Id. at 551.
73. 408 U.S. at 684.
74. Id. at 707.
75. See Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 966 (1973) (identity of a confidential source sought and refused);
Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (disclosure of unpub-
lished background materials sought and refused); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v.
McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973) (disclosure of unpublished back-
ground materials sought and refused). But see Lewis v. United States, 501
F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913 (1975) (rejected claim of
privilege by radio station manager to withhold original document of Weather
Underground and tape recording of Symbionese Liberation Army from fed-
eral grand jury). For further discussion of the judicial development of a re-
porter's privilege, see Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing
Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975); Murasky, The
Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEx. L. REv. 829
(1974).
76. See Note, Reporter's Privilege-Guardian of the People's Right to Know?, 11
NEw ENG. L. REv. 405 (1976).
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In Pell v. Procunier77 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,78 the
Supreme Court again tangentially addressed the issue of a first
amendment right of access. In opinions authored by Justice Stew-
art,79 the Court rejected claims by the press that it has a right of
access to interview specific individual inmates and that prison reg-
ulations which prohibited such interviews infringed on the peti-
tioner's first amendment rights.80 The reasoning in both cases was
substantially similar.81 The Court based its holdings, in part, on
the fact that the prison policies in question allowed the press,
under prison supervision and restrictions, to observe prison condi-
tions and to carry on limited interviews with random prisoners.
This, the Court said, allowed the press to fulfill its watchdog func-
tion over public institutions.8 2 More importantly, in both cases the
Court reemphasized the Branzburg reasoning that the press has
no greater right of access than that of the general public. 83 How-
77. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). For further discussion of Pell and Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974), see Note, Prison Regulation Prohibiting Inter-
views Between Newsmen and Inmates Held Constitutional, 60 CORNELL L.
REV. 446 (1975); Note, A Giant Step Backwards: The Supreme Court Speaks
Out on Prisoners' First Amendment Rights, 70 Nw. U. L REv. 352 (1975).
78. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
79. In Pell, Justice Stewart was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White, Blackmun and Rehnquist. Justice Powell filed a separate opinion in
which he concurred with the majority that the prison regulations had not in-
fringed on the first amendment rights of the inmates. However, he dissented
on the question of a right of access for the press, stating: "I would hold that
California's absolute ban against prisoner-press interviews impermissibly re-
strains the ability of the press to perform its constitutionally established
function of informing the people on the conduct of their government." 417
U.S. at 835 (Powell, J., dissenting in part). Justice Douglas, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, filed a dissenting opinion.
In Saxbe, Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief Jus-
tice Burger again made up the majority. Justice Douglas dissented and sim-
ply referred to his dissent in Pell. Justice Powell filed a strong dissent and
was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
80. Pell challenged § 415.071 of the California Department of Corrections Manual
(1971) which reads: "Press and other media interviews with specific individ-
ual inmates will not be permitted." 417 U.S. at 819. In Saxbe, the Washington
Post challenged Policy Statement 1220.1A 4b(6) of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons (1972) which reads:
Press representatives will not be permitted to interview individual
inmates. This rule shall apply even where the inmate requests or
seeks an interview. However, conversation may be permitted with
inmates whose identity is not to be made public, if it is limited to the
discussion of institutional facilities, programs and activities.
417 U.S. at 844 n.1.
81. However, in Pell the Court addressed the additional question of the constitu-
tional right of inmates to seek individual interviews with members of the
press. 417 U.S. at 821-28.
82. Id. at 830-31; Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 847-49.
83. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 834 Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 849-
50.
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ever, in Pell, the Court once again fueled the access debate by ac-
knowledging that "news gathering is not without its First
Amendment protections ....
Finally, in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,8 5 the Supreme Court
squarely confronted the issue of whether the public and press
have an affirmative right of access to information controlled by the
government. In a four-to-three vote 86 the Court reversed a lower
court injunction which ordered prison officials to grant the press
access to certain prison facilities which had previously been closed
to public and press inspection. However, there was no clear-cut
majority holding. Three members of the plurality found no first
amendment right of access to information or sources of informa-
tion within the government's control.87 Justice Stewart concurred
on somewhat narrower grounds, restating his argument in Pell and
Saxbe that the press has no right of access "superior to that of the
public generally." 88
The dissenters distinguished Pell and Saxbe as cases where
substantial access had already existed.89 However, Houchins
demonstrated "[a] n official prison policy [of concealment] by arbi-
trarily cutting off the flow of information at its source . ... "90 The
dissenters agreed with the majority that the press had no greater
right of access than the public, but concluded that "[w] ithout some
protection for the acquisition of information about the operation of
public institutions ... the process of self-governance contem-
plated by the Framers would be stripped of its substance."9 1
After Houchins, the Court's theory of a right of access was best
summarized by an extrajudicial statement by Justice Stewart
where he concluded:
The press is free to do battle against secrecy and deception in govern-
ment. But the press cannot expect from the Constitution any guarantee
that it will succeed. There is no constitutional right to have access to par-
84. 417 U.S. at 833 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 707).
85. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). For further discussion of Houchins and the issue of a right
to access, see Cairney, Sunlight in the County Jail: Houchins v. KQED, Inc.
and Constitutional Protection For Newsgathering, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
933 (1979).
86. Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices White and Rehnquist in the judg-
ment of the Court. Justice Stewart filed a separate opinion concurring in the
judgment. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Powell, filed the
dissenting opinion. Justices Marshall and Blackmun took no part in the deci-
sion.
87. 438 U.S. at 9.
88. Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart modified this statement
somewhat by suggesting that the concept of equal access must be flexible
enough to "accommodate the practical distinctions between the press and
the general public." Id. at 16.
89. Id. at 24-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J. & Powell, J.).
90. Id. at 38.
91. Id. at 32.
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ticular government information, or to require openness from the bureau-
cracy. The public's interest in knowing about its government is protected
by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect. The Con-
stitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official
Secrets Act.
The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its resolu-
tion.
9 2
Justice Powell, in his dissent in Saxbe, quite correctly pointed
out the implications of this view by stating:
From all that appears in the Court's opinion, one would think that any
governmental restriction on access to information, no matter how severe,
would be constitutionally acceptable to the majority so long as it does not
single out the media for special disabilities not applicable to the public at
large.
9 3
In conclusion, the Court's theory of a right of access for the public
and press might be best summarized as one of equal treatment
rather than equal rights.
94
C. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale95 represents the first time the
Supreme Court addressed the question of access within the con-
text of a fair trial-free press conflict. In a five-to-four decision,96 the
Court held that the sixth amendment right to a public trial is per-
sonal to the accused and does not give the public or the press a
right of access to a pretrial suppression hearing, if the accused, the
prosecutor and the trial judge all agree that the proceeding should
be closed in order to assure a fair trial.97 In reaching its decision,
the Court cited Sheppard for the proposition that "a trial judge has
an affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the effects of preju-
dicial pretrial publicity,"98 and that pretrial suppression hearings
present special risks of unfairness. 99
92. Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975) (footnote omitted)
(excerpted from an address delivered on November 2, 1974, at Yale Law
School).
93. 417 U.S. at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting).
94. P. Tosh, Equal Rights, "Equal Rights," Side 2 BL 643740 (CBS 1977).
95. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
96. Id. The majority consisted of Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justice Blackmun, joined by
Justices Brennan, White and Marshall, concurred in part and dissented in
part. Id. at 406.
97. Id. at 394. However, the Court emphasized that "[w]hile the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees to a defendant in a criminal case the right to a public trial, it
does not guarantee the right to compel a private trial." Id. at 382.
98. 443 U.S. at 378.
99. Id. The Court stated that the danger that prejudice will result from publica-
tion of a pretrial suppression hearing is particularly acute since the purpose
of a suppression hearing is to screen inadmissible evidence which will not be
presented at trial. Therefore, the publication of inadmissible evidence could
1981]
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In concluding that the sixth amendment guarantee of a public
trial is personal to the accused, the Court acknowledged that
"there is a strong societal interest in public trials."100 However,
that interest is not elevated to constitutional stature. Therefore,
the sixth amendment does not provide a public right of access.10'
The Court added that any public interest is fully protected by the
"participants in the litigation."'1 2 The Court declined to decide
whether the public had a first amendment right of access to crimi-
nal proceedings, 103 stating that even if such a right existed, it was
given "all appropriate deference" by the trial court.
0 4
Justice Powell was the only member of either the majority or
dissent to recognize a first amendment right of public access. Al-
though concurring with the majority, he would have held that the
press, as an agent of the public, has a first amendment right to be
present at the hearing.105 Nevertheless, he added that the right of
access is not absolute and is subject to limitation by the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial.
106
The scope of Gannett immediately became the subject of wide-
spread confusion among both journalists 0 7 and commentators. 108
have a prejudicial effect on potential jurors. However, the Court noted that
"[a] fter the commencement of the trial itself, inadmissible prejudicial infor-
mation about a defendant can be kept from a jury by a variety of means." Id.
100. Id. at 383.
101. Id.
102. Id. However, Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, suggested that the public's
interest needs to be protected from the trial participants. Id. at 438 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting in part).
103. 443 U.S. at 392.
104. Id. It should be noted that the trial court's treatment of the closure order and
subsequent hearing on the motion to vacate the order was substantially simi-
lar in Gannett and Richmond. In both cases the defendant, prosecutor and
trial judge agreed to close the proceeding, no objection was made by the
press at the time of the closure motion and order, and a subsequent hearing
was granted to argue the validity of the closure order. Id. at 375-77. For a
discussion of the procedure in Richmond, see notes 17-19 & accompanying
text supra.
105. 443 U.S. at 397-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 398.
107. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2841 n.2 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
108. For a sampling of the reaction to Gannett, see Borow & Kruth, Closed Prelimi-
nary Hearings: The Constitutionality of Penal Code Section 868 in the After-
math of Gannett v. DePasquale, 55 CAL. ST. B. J. 18 (1980); Densford,
Courthouse Doors Slam Shut Behind Gannett, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 13, 1979, at 8;
Goodale, Gannett Means What It Says; But Who Knows What It Says?, NAT'L
I J., Oct. 15, 1979, at 20; Keeffe, The Boner Called Gannett, 66 A.B.A. J. 227
(1980); Paul, Gannett v. DePasquale-What To Do About It?, COM. 1- 21
(1979); Stephenson, supra note 31; Comment, Public Access to Pretrial Crimi-
nal Hearings: The Use of Closure Orders After Gannett v. DePasquale, 44
ALB. L REv. 455 (1980); Note, A Right of Access to a Criminal Courtroom:
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The controversy centered around the question of whether the deci-
sion was limited to pretrial suppression hearings or also applied to
other court proceedings, including trials. The confusion was un-
derstandable. Gannett can only be described as ambiguous. This
ambiguity resulted from the fact that "[n]o less than 12 times in
the primary opinion ... the Court ... observed that its Sixth
Amendment closure ruling applied to the trial itself."'10 9 The puz-
zle of interpretation was compounded by the Chief Justice who ex-
plicitly stated that in his view the decision only applied to pretrial
suppression hearings, yet nonetheless joined the Court's opin-
ion.11o In subsequent extrajudicial statements, several of the par-
ticipating Justices made it clear that they still did not agree on just
what the Court had decided."'
Considering this ambiguity, it is not surprising that the lower
courts began closing trials as well as pretrial suppression hear-
ings.112 The lower courts simply had reacted as Justice Blackmun
had predicted. 113 However, this rash of closure orders required the
Court to once again examine the question of a public right of ac-
cess to judicial proceedings.
IV. ANALYSIS
Like its predecessor in Gannett, the plurality opinion in Rich-
mond" 4 presents a problem of interpretation which turns on sub-
tle semantics. The majority" 5 unquestionably held that "a
presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 51 CoLO. L. REV. 425 (1980); The Supreme Court,
1978 Term, 93 HARv. L REV. 1, 60 (1979).
109. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2841 (1980) (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
110. 443 U.S. at 394-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
111. THE NEWS MEDIA & THE LAw, Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 5.
112. For a comprehensive list of court closures and closure motions see Paul,
supra note 108, at 40-70; THE NEWS MEDIA & THE LAw, Aug.-Sept. 1980, at 4.
113. "Under this analysis, the defendant-so long as the prosecution and the
judge agree-may surely close a full trial on the merits as well as a pretrial
suppresion hearing." 443 U.S. at 438 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
114. Since the Stevenson trial had long since ended, there was a suggestion that
the case was moot. However, as in Gannett and Nebraska Press, the dispute
was deemed "capable of repetition, yet evading review" and, therefore, not
moot. 100 S. Ct. at 2820-21 (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219
U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
115. In Richmond, there were five separate opinions and two concurrences filed.
The four separate majority opinions were authored by: the Chief Justice
(joined by Justices White and Stevens), id. at 2818, Justice Brennan (joined
by Justice Marshall), id. at 2832, and Justices Stewart, id. at 2839, and Black-
mun, id. at 2841. Justice Rehnquist filed the only dissenting opinion. Id. at
2842. Justice-Powell, a former Richmond, Virginia resident, took no part in
the decision. Id. at 2818.
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trial .... ,,116 that, without more, the agreement of the trial partici-
pants is not enough to justify closure, and that the public and press
have a first amendment right of access to criminal trials." 7 The
majority also basically agreed that Gannett held only that "the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee to the accused of a public trial gave
neither the public nor the press an enforceable right of access to a
pretrial suppression hearing," 1 8 leaving open the question of
whether a right of access might be guaranteed by another constitu-
tional provision. However, after this initial consonance, opinions
of the plurality present a myriad of rationales and qualifications as
to the source and the scope of the public right of access to criminal
trials.
A. The Characterization of the Issue
In Richmond, the Court was correct in characterizing the clo-
sure of a trial as a question of access within the fair trial-free press
conflict rather than merely treating the issue as an extension of
Sheppard and Nebraska Press. Although the Court did not specifi-
cally state its reasons for this characterization, the point is worth
discussing in order to demonstrate the precedential pressures
116. 100 S. Ct. at 2825 (Burger, C.J., joined by White, J. & Stevens, J.).
117. Although not directly at issue, the majority generally agreed that the pre-
sumption of openness also applied to civil trials. 100 S. Ct. at 2829 n.17.
118. Id. at 2821 (Burger, C.J., joined by White, J. & Stevens, J.). Even so, the scope
of Gannett is not entirely clear. Justice Stewart, in his separate opinion in
Richmond stated that the sixth amendment "does not confer ... any right of
access to a trial." Id. at 2839 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
However, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White, Stevens, Brennan, Mar-
shall and Blackmun adopted or concurred with the limitations of Gannett to
pretrial suppression hearings.
Justices White and Blackmun, apparently refusing to lay down the swords
of their dissent in Gannett, attempted to strike one more blow in Richmond.
Justice White stated his view in a succinct concurrence with Chief Justice
Burger's opinion:
This case would have been unnecessary had Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale... construed the Sixth Amendment to forbid excluding
the public from criminal proceedings except in narrowly defined cir-
cumstances. But the Court there rejected the submission of four of
us to this effect, thus requiring that the First Amendment issue in-
volved here be addressed. On this issue, I concur in the opinion of
THE CHIEF JUSTICE.
Id. at 2830 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Justice Blackmun, in his separate opinion, stated that he still believes that
Gannett was incorrectly decided and remains "convinced that the right to a
public trial is to be found where the Constitution explictly placed it-in the
Sixth Amendment." Id. at 2842 (Blackmun, J.). However, after reconciling
himself to the fact that the scope of the sixth amendment had been defined,
he concluded "as a secondary position, that the First Amendment must pro-
vide some measure of protection for public access to the trial." Id.
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which helped to shape the Court's decision. The closure of a court
proceeding, as in Richmond and Gannett, seems to present a novel
question which falls outside of the scope of the Court's previous
fair trial-free press cases. The use of closure to protect a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial 19 is neither listed among the Sheppard
alternatives nor specifically proscribed by the Nebraska Press limi-
tations on prior restraints.
120
At first glance, a court closure may appear to be analogous to a
prior restraint. They are similar in effect, and both are ex parte
orders which prevent or postpone the publication of news concern-
ing a court proceeding. However, upon closer examination, there
appear to be three major distinctions between prior restraints and
court closures. First, a prior restraint may be variable in its scope,
while a closure order is limited to that proceeding or proceedings
covered in the order. More specifically, a prior restraint, such as
the order at issue in Nebraska Press,121 may apply to information
received both in and out of the proceeding. A closure order, on the
other hand, only limits publication of information presented within
the proceeding.
22
In addition, the two orders differ, from the news media's point
of view, in the probable benefits of their violation. A prior restraint
is an order not to publish, while a closure order is an order not to
attend. Since a prior restraint allows attendance at a court pro-
ceeding, the press, for the sake of reporting the news, may make an
informed choice to violate the order, publish the restricted infor-
mation, and, thereby, face a possible contempt citation. 123 A clo-
119. The lower courts have approved limited closures for reasons other than pro-
tecting a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. See, e.g., United States ex
rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937
(1975) (protecting young complaining witness in a rape case); Stamicarbon v.
American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1974) (avoiding disclosure of
corporate trade secrets); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972) (preserving confidentiality of skyjacker proffle);
Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842
(1959) (protecting identity of an undercover agent).
120. However, in Nebraska Press, Chief Justice Burger did imply that closure of a
preliminary hearing possibly was an acceptable alternative. He stated: '"The
County Court could not know that closure of the preliminary hearing was an
alternative open to it until the Nebraska Supreme Court so construed state
law .. " 427 U.S. at 568.
121. See note 57 & accompanying text supra.
122. However, what constitutes the proceeding appears to be somewhat within
the discretion of the trial judge. For example, the closure order which was
the subject of Richmond was deemed by the trial judge to encompass the
hearing on the motion to vacate the closure order. See note 20 supra.
123. For a discussion of contempt citations arising from the violation of a prior
restraint, see Note, Protective Orders Against the Press and the Inherent Pow-
ers of the Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 342 (1977).
1981]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
sure order, however, eliminates any choice. 124 Practically
speaking, any attempt to invade a closed court probably would be
fruitless in terms of news gathering. The trial simply would stop
until the invader was cited for contempt and ejected.
The final and most important distinction between a prior re-
traint and a closure order is in the methods by which they restrict
the publication of the news. As mentioned above, a prior restraint
restricts the press from publishing information presented at trial,
but not from attending the trial. In essence, a prior restraint al-
lows the public and press to gather news, but prevents them from
publishing the news. On the other hand, a closure order prevents
the public and press from attending trial in order to prevent the
publication of the news by preventing access to the news. Thus,
the major distinction between a prior restraint and a closure order
is that a prior restraint prevents publication of information while a
closure order prevents access to information.
This distinction between proscriptions on publication and pro-
scriptions on access has been a major pressure point in the devel-
opment of the Supreme Court's theory of the first amendment.
125
Because Nebraska Press virtually eliminated prior restraints on
the publication of information presented at trial,126 it can be ar-
gued that the first amendment gives the press a right to publish
the news it has gathered. However, this does not mean that the
press has an unconditional right to gather news. Until Richmond,
a majority of the Court had never recognized a first amendment
right of access. As Justice Stevens stated, it is the recognition of a
right of access which makes Richmond a "watershed case."'
127
B. The Source of the Right
The characterization of Richmond as an access question was
only the first problem faced by the Court in reaching its decision.
124. First amendment rights tend to be personal to the individual. The existence
of first amendment rights most often comes into issue when the individual
has challenged a majoritarian opinion or the order of a governmental author-
ity. Considering the sheer power and chilling effect of this sort of opposition,
in order for the individual to practice his first amendment rights, he must be
willing to vigorously assert those rights. Thus, it could be said that the prac-
tice and principles of the first amendment require that the individual be
strong enough to assert his rights. Therefore, it is arguable that a closure
order is more offensive than a prior restraint. The individual faced with a
prior restraint at least has the choice to be strong, violate the order and test
his rights. However, a closure order, which prohibits access to information,
does not allow the individual a choice to violate the order and, therefore, does
not allow him a choice to be strong.
125. See § II of text infra.
126. See note 66 & accompanying text supra.
127. 100 S. Ct. at 2830 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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More importantly, the Court had to clarify Gannett and find a way
to keep trials open. Avoiding either part of the problem could have
resulted in turning the nation's courts into a system of secret jus-
tice. 128 However, in constructing a method to meet these
problems, the Court was confronted with two major stumbling
blocks. The first was Gannett itself. The Court's vague holding in
Gannett that the sixth amendment public trial right was personal
to the accused was the very reasoning used by the lower courts to
justify trial closures. 12 9 Unless the Court was willing to substan-
tially overrule Gannett, it was foreclosed from finding a public
right of access to criminal trials in the sixth amendment.
130
The second precedential problem faced by the Court was its
prior treatment of the first amendment public right of access ques-
tion. In this area, the Houchins holding that there was no first
amendment right of access to information or sources of informa-
tion within the government's control was particularly trouble-
some.131 A trial courtroom is certainly a government institution,
and a rule which allows the closure of that courtroom certainly
puts trial information within governmental control. Therefore, it
could easily have been argued that a closed trial was the same as a
closed prison facility, and that there was no first amendment right
of access to either.
As a result, in order to open trials the Court basically had two
options: It could overrule its entire line of access cases, which
would have resulted in subjecting almost all governmental institu-
tions and information to public scrutiny under a broad right of ac-
cess; or, it could have created a limited right of access, which
would have been sufficient to open trials and still be somewhat
congruent with its prior cases. This option would have allowed the
Court a substantial degree of control over the future development
of a public right of access to governmental institutions.
After clarifying and limiting Gannett, the Court chose the sec-
ond alternative and set to work structuring a limited right of public
access to criminal trials. Richmond contains two primary theories
of the source of the right. The first is authored by Chief Justice
Burger and the second by Justice Brennan.
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Stevens,
found the source of the public access right to criminal trials in the
Anglo-American history of the judicial process and in the speech,
press and assembly clauses of the first amendment. The Chief
128. See id. at 2837-39 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).
129. Gannett was cited by the Virginia Supreme Court in upholding the closure
order at issue. See note 29 & accompanying text supra.
130. See 100 S. Ct. at 2841-42 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
131. For a discussion of Houchins, see notes 85-91 & accompanying text supra.
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Justice' historical analysis 132 served as a policy statement in sup-
port of his decision. He stated that in the long tradition of Anglo-
American justice, criminal trials were presumptively open to the
public. 133 Attendance was encouraged so the public could "satisfy
themselves that justice was in fact being done."' 34 This policy of
openness helped assure that the proceedings were conducted
fairly, and protected the judge and other trial participants from un-
founded accusations of impropriety and dishonesty.135 Through-
out history, he stated, the public trial has had a "therapeutic
value" as a safety valve for an angry public.136 When a particularly
shocking crime has enraged a community, a public trial helped to
satisfy the appearance of justice, explain an unpopular result, and
prevent vigilante retribution. Finally, he noted that, historically,
public unruliness in the courtroom has been controlled by rules of
conduct rather than closure.
31
Like the rest of the majority, the Chief Justice found the consti-
tutional basis for the public right of access to criminal trials within
the first amendment. However, in his view, access is essentially a
penumbra right,138 born within the context of the Court's self-gov-
ernment theory' 3 9 and fashioned from the speech, press and as-
sembly clauses. As the Chief Justice stated:
132. See 100 S. Ct. at 2821-26. A detailed discussion of the historical bases of the
open criminal trial is beyond the scope of this note. For such a discussion
and further authority, see Gannett v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 406 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting in part); 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVI-
DENCE 522-27 (1827); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373; M. HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (6th ed. 1820); F. HELLER, THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 30 (1951); Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6
TEMPLE L.Q. 81 (1931).
133. 100 S. Ct. at 2823.
134. Id. at 2825.
135. Id. at 2824.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2822-23.
138. See id. at 2829 n.16. The Chief Justice did not explicitly refer to the public
right of access as a penumbra. However, in supporting his construction of the
right, he did cite to recognized penumbra decisions such as Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (right to privacy); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1959) (right of
association). 100 S. Ct. at 2829 n.16.
139. Essentially, the self-government theory states that the purpose of free speech
is to help the people govern themselves in a democratic society. Therefore,
speech which serves this purpose is considered to be of particular value and
subject to a higher degree of protection. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 18-19, 22-27 (1948); J. MILL, ES-
SAYS ON GOVERNMENT, JURISPRUDENCE, LIBERTY OF THE PRESS AND LAW OF
NATIONS 19, 28 (1825).
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These expressly guaranteed freedoms share a common core purpose of
assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning
of government. Plainly it would be difficult to single out any aspect of gov-
ernment of higher concern and importance to the people than the manner
in which criminal trials are conducted .... 140
In explaining his reasoning behind the construction of the pub-
lic right of access, the Chief Justice pointed out that the freedoms
of speech and press are not limited to the protection of the speaker
or writer. The first amendment also protects the right of the lis-
tener to receive information and ideas.141 This broad right to
speak and listen, combined with the right to assemble in public
places,142 creates a public right of access to criminal trial court-
rooms, which traditionally are public places. 143
The Chief Justice simply distinguished Pell and Saxbe as cases
dealing with penal institutions which do not have this tradition of
openness and, therefore, are not subject to the application of the
new right of access.144 The task of paying heed to precedent fell to
Justice Stevens, a proponent of a public right of access and the
author of the dissenting opinion in Houchins.14 5 He applauded the
Richmond decision, but wrote to point out the incongruity of the
Chief Justice' theory, which opens the trials to public inspection
but does not allow the same type of public oversight of the subse-
140. 100 S. Ct. at 2826-27.
141. Id. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1962).
142. "People assemble in public places not only to speak or to take action, but also
to listen, observe, and learn. . . ." 100 S. Ct. at 2828.
143. One commentator has suggested a similar formula for creating a first amend-
ment public right of access to criminal trials. See Note, Trial Secrecy and the
First Amendment Right of Public Access to Judicial Proceedings, 91 HARv. L
REv. 1899 (1978). This right
is grounded in the rights of public discussion and personal autonomy
embraced by the constitutional guarantee of free speech rather than
a concern for just results in particular cases.
... The Supreme Court has therefore recognized that the 'right to
receive information and ideas ... is fundamental to our free society.'
The duty to provide some means for the dissemination of speech is
reflected in the minimum access interpretation of the public forum
doctrine.
Id. at 1902-03 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
144. 100 S. Ct. at 2828 n.13. The Chief Justice sdemed somewhat reluctant to ex-
plicitly label the right to attend criminal trials as right of access. He stated-
It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend criminal
trials to hear, see, and communicate observations concerning them
as a 'right of access,'.. . or a 'right to gather information,' for we
have recognized that 'without some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.'
Id. at 2827 (citations omitted).
145. See 438 U.S. at 19 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J. & Powell, J.);
notes 89-91 & accompanying text supra.
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quent step in the criminal justice system.146 Such a limitation is
all the more serious, he explained, because cases such as Houchins
involve "the plight of a segment of society least able to protect it-
self .... "147
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, disagreed with the
Chief Justice on two primary points. First, Justice Brennan stated
that the public right of access is not new to constitutional law.
148
The right has always existed, but until Richmond has never been
asserted in a circumstance which commanded recognition by a ma-
jority of the Court. Prior decisions, such as Pell, Houchins, and
Saxbe, only held that "any privilege of access to governmental in-
formation is subject to a degree of restraint dictated by the nature
of the information and countervailing interests in security and con-
fidentiality."
1 49
Furthermore, Justice Brennan disagreed with the Chief Justice
concerning the structure of the right. He acknowledged that the
first amendment embodies more than the rights to speak and lis-
ten. However, instead of constructing the public right of access out
of a conglomeration of first amendment clauses, Justice Brennan
began his analysis by pointing out that the first amendment has a
"structural role to play" in securing and fostering self-govern-
ment.15 0 This "structural model links the First Amendment to that
process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive
. . "151 Thus, Justice Brennan's model of the first amendment
and the right of access protects both wide-open debate and the
processes by which information is gathered to fuel the debate.
15 2
Despite this broad language, Justice Brennan apparently was
not ready to subject all of government to an unconditional public
right of access. 153 In order to determine when access to a govern-
mental institution or process should be allowed, he proposed a
two-tiered test. The governmental institution or process in ques-
tion should be examined to determine: (1) whether it represents
146. 100 S. Ct. at 2830-31 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens viewed the
Richmond decision as recognizing a broad right of access. He stated: '"To-
day, however, for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbi-
trary interference with access to important information is an abridgment of
the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by the First Amendment."
Id. at 2831.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2832 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).
149. Id. at 2833.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2834.
153. "An assertion of the prerogative to gather information must accordingly be
assayed by considering the information sought and the opposing interests in-
vaded." Id.
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an area of traditional openness; and (2) whether access to that in-
stitution or process is important to the function of that process.
15
The first tier is basically a historical question. Applied to the
issue of closure orders, Justice Brennan determined, upon the ba-
sis of a historical analysis simliar to that of the Chief Justice, that
"criminal proceedings" are an area of traditional openness. 155
in the second tier of his analysis, he noted that '"p]ublicity
serves to advance several of the particular purposes of [the] trial
• . . process," such as helping to protect a criminal defendant's fair
trial right.156 In addition, he pointed out that the trial process
serves other political interests which are advanced by public ac-
cess. First, "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice" to
demonstrate to the members of society that "they are governed eq-
uitably."'5 7 Secondly, he stated that because the courts are re-
sponsible for "construing and securing constitutional rights" they
are, in essence, part of the lawmaking process. 58 Because trial
courts are making law which will later be interpreted to affect indi-
viduals not involved in the particular litigation, trials are "preemi-
nently a matter of public interest."' 59 Therefore, just as in the
legislative process, public access to trials acts as a check on the
courts' lawmaking function. Finally, Justice Brennan explained
that public access assists the factfinding process of trials by bring-
ing unknown witnesses forward and by encouraging those wit-
nesses who are already present to be more candid.
160
In conclusion, Justice Brennan found that trials are a tradi-
tional area of openness and that "public access is an indispensable
element of the trial process itself.'61 Therefore, both tiers of his
public access test had been satisfied, tipping "the balance strongly
toward the rule that trials be open."' 62
A comparison of the two theories offered by the Chief Justice
and Justice Brennan, presents two points of disagreement. The
first concerns the existence of a right of access prior to Richmond.
The Chief Justice states that the right is a new penumbral discov-
ery, while Justice Brennan maintains that the right has always ex-
isted but has never received an affirmative treatment until
154. Id. at 2834-36.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2837.
157. Id. (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). See also United
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
158. 100 S. Ct. at 2838 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).
159. Id.
160. Id. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRLs IN CoMMoN LAws § 1834 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1976); Radin, supra note 132, at 384.
161. 100 S. Ct. at 2839 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).
162. Id.
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Richmond. Much of the resolution of this disagreement turns on
the philosophies expressed by individual members of the Court in
Branzburg, Pell, Saxbe, and Houchins.
163
Chief Justice Burger is correct in two respects: (1) No majority
of the Court has ever held a right of access to exist;164 and (2) in
his Houchins opinion, the Chief Justice made it quite clear he did
not recognize "a right of access to government information or
sources of information within the government's control."'165 How-
ever, Justice Brennan's view-backed by strong dissents,16 6 the ar-
guments of commentators, 67 and an occasional peace-saving
phrase in a majority opinionl 68-- demonstrates that the right of ac-
cess has been, and will continue to be, a hotly contested issue. In
the future development of the public right of access, it is quite
likely that Justice Brennan's view will be favored. The Court will
not be allowed to forget its previous theory of access which
spawned such irritating offspring as Pell, Saxbe and Houchins.
The second point of disagreement concerns the structure of the
right. The basic terms of the two theories of access appear to be
quite similar. Both chart the right of access as radiating from
somewhere within the first amendment, and both place a good deal
of weight on traditional openness. 69 However, the two theories
are not simply the same rule expressed in the terms of different
constitutional philosophies. 170 The Chief Justice' penumbra the-
ory and Justice Brennan's structural model each present distinct
implications for the future definition and scope of the right of ac-
163. See § rI-B of text supra.
164. Id.
165. 438 U.S. at 15.
166. See § Ill-B of text supra.
167. See note 32 supra.
168. See, e.g., notes 74, 84 & accompanying text supra.
169. The Court's reliance on tradition as part of the test to determine whether
there exists a first amendment right of access presents some interesting
questions. For example, it is questionable whether tradition should play any
part in a first amendment analysis. First amendment problems are probably
more accurately solved by applying the ever changing, yet still constant, prin-
ciples of free expression. Furthermore, if the Court does choose to make his-
torical study part of its first amendment theory, what is the result when the
tradition, itself, proves to be unconstitutional? Finally, the Court's use of tra-
dition appears to be more akin to due process analysis than it does to first
amendment theory. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S 319 (1937). If the Court has indeed adopted a due proc-
ess analysis to determine the scope of the right of access, then it is possible
that a closure order could be challenged, alternatively, on first amendment
and on due process grounds.
170. It could be argued that Chief Justice Burger's penumbra might have been the
result of his strict constructionist method of solving constitutional problems,
while Justice Brennan's structural model seems to show his theoretical lean-
ings in the application of the first amendment.
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cess. The Chief Justice' penumbra theory emphasizes a strong re-
liance on a "public places" requirement. 171 It appears that his view
of the public right of access might best be described as the mainte-
nance of the status quo. That is, those institutions which are open
will remain open and those which are closed may remain closed.
On the other hand, Justice Brennan's structural model sets up a
method by which some closed governmental institutions and those
institutions which allow limited access might be opened to the
sunlight of public inspection. Although Justice Brennan relied on
the requirement of traditional openness,17 2 historical analysis is
just as subject to argument and disagreement as is any purely con-
ceptual legal principle. But more importantly, the structural
model is completely in line with what many commentators have
referred to as the larger role of the first amendment in the gov-
erning of a democratic society. 7 3 This view emphasizes that the
people are the governmental decision makers. In such a system of
self-governance, access to governmental institutions and processes
is strongly favored in order to allow the people the information
they need to make their own decisions. Justice Brennan's struc-
tural model, although somewhat limited by his traditional open-
ness requirement, could become the basis for a new onslaught
against the barriers of access.
C. The Right of Access to Criminal Trials-Its Limits
Despite the efforts of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan
to construct a constitutional basis for a right of access, the parame-
ters of its application to criminal trials are far from clear. All the
members of the majority agreed that the right is not absolute.
However, beyond this initial observation, "uncertainty marks the
nature... of the standard of closure the Court adopts."'' 7 4 None-
theless, some general guidelines can be isolated.
The majority emphasized the dominion of a trial judge over the
171. The Chief Justice listed streets, sidewalks, and parks as places which are
"traditionally open" and "where First Amendment rights may be exercised."
100 S. Ct. at 2828.
172. It is possible that Justice Brennan included the historical requirement as a
part of his public access test in order to create a precedent which could later
be used in a reexamination of closures of pretrial proceedings like the pro-
ceeding in Gannett.
173. For a discussion of the larger role of the first amendment, see ELY, DEMoc-
RACY AND DISTRUST 93-94 (1980); T. EMERSON, supra note 61, at 7; A.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 139, passim; L. TRmE, supra note 56, at 576-79; Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 23
(1971); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1965).
174. 100 S. Ct. at 2842 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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atmosphere in the courtroom, even though the imposition of deco-
rum may somewhat limit access.175 This dominion includes time,
place and manner restrictions to assure that trials are conducted
in a "quiet and orderly setting."'176 Furthermore, Richmond pre-
serves the validity of the Sheppard alternatives, 177 and it appears
that these alternatives must, at least, be considered before a clo-
sure order may be issued.178 Finally, the majority generally agreed
that some justification is required in order to close a trial. How-
ever, in attempting to define what is sufficient justification, the
Richmond plurality did not provide a clear answer. Nevertheless,
it does appear that four members of the Court would require at
least "an overriding interest articulated in the findings" to reverse
the presumption of openness. 179 These four votes, along with the
vote of Justice Blackmun, who insisted that trials are open to the
public, 180 might be sufficient to provide a degree of guidance to the
lower courts. However, any more definite standard will have to be
forged by subsequent decisions. But no matter how it is subse-
quently phrased, it is clear that the standard which must be met in
order to close a trial is substantially less demanding than the Ne-
braska Press prior restraint test.' 8 ' Such inconsistency is hard to
justify. The practical effect of both orders is to prevent or postpone
the publication of news of court proceedings. Therefore, the
175. Id. at 2830 n.18 (Burger, C.J., joined by White, J. & Stevens, J.); id. at 2839 n.23
(Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.) ("reasonable restrictions im-
posed upon courtroom behavior in the interests of decorum"); id. at 2840
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("reasonable limitations upon the unrestricted oc-
cupation of a courtroom").
Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan accepted the view of the
press as an agent of the public. Furthermore, although the press and public
are equal, the press might be allowed special access or treatment in the
courtroom. Id. at 2825 (Burger, C.J., joined by White, J. & Stevens, J.); id. at
2831 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).
176. Id. at 2830 n.18 (Burger, C.J., joined by White, J. & Stevens, J.).
177. See note 49 & accompanying text supra.
178. 100 S. Ct. at 2830 (Burger, C.J., joined by White, J. & Stevens, J.); id. at 2839
n.25 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.); id. at 2840 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
179. Id. at 2830 (Burger, C.J., joined by White, J. & Stevens, J.). The Chief Justice
and Justice White appeared to agree on this language. However, Justice Ste-
vens, who concurred with the Chief Justice, seemed to hedge on this stan-
dard and probably would require a lesser standard. Id. at 2831 n.2, 2832
(Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
seemed to require "compelling" justification. However, he explicitly refused
to discuss what fact situations would meet his standard. Id. at 2839 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).
180. It appears that Justice Blackmun is determined to keep trials open on
whatever theory the court may adopt. See id. at 2841-42 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring).
181. See notes 64-66 & accompanying text supra.
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Court's reasoning for prescribing different standards for the two
orders must center around how each order prevents or postpones
publication.
182
A prior restraint restricts publication by proscribing firsthand
observers from publishing what they see or hear. In essence,
under a prior restraint, the press and public are told they may at-
tend the court proceeding, but they may not communicate their
observations to others. However, although they may not communi-
cate what they have learned, their personal access to the informa-
tion has not been proscribed. A closure order, on the other hand,
restricts publication by proscribing access to the court proceeding.
Therefore, in addition to restricting publication, a closure order
also prevents the press and public from learning firsthand about
the trial activities. It prevents their personal access to the infor-
mation.
In light of this distinction, it could certainly be argued that a
closure order represents the more severe infringement of first
amendment rights since it does not even allow the interested citi-
zen to learn, by personal observation, what transpires in the court-
room. Nevertheless, the Court has not accepted this reasoning.
Under the Court's theory of the first amendment, it is apparently a
greater infringement to prevent an individual from communicating
what he knows or believes than it is to prevent access to the source
which provides the basis for the individual's knowledge or beliefs.
This less stringent standard for a closure order may stem from an
attitude that a closure order is less of an infringement because an
individual cannot be prevented from communicating what he does
not know.
D. The Impact of Richmond
I was hopeful of victory but fearful that the court might shrink from the
sweeping implications of recognizing, for the first time, an affnrmative right
of access and newsgathering under the First Amendment. All who cherish
an open society are profoundly grateful that the court was not so timid.
The full reach of the right established in Richmond may not be clear for
decades. Efforts to establish the right of access in contexts other than
criminal trials will not always succeed. But the right will not be easily
confined, and its broad affirmation in Richmond Newspapers marks a
milestone.
1 8 3
There is little question that Richmond will be primarily
remembered as the decision which recognized a first amendment
public right of access, and it is in the area of access where its im-
182. See § IV-A of text supra.
183. PRESSTnME, Aug. 1980, at 10 (quoting Professor Laurence H. Tribe who argued
the case for Richmond Newspapers, Inc.).
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pact will be felt. Since a total of eight members of the Court184
have recognized the right, future opponents of access are going to
be hard pressed to deny its existence.
Arguments over the scope of the right are far from over. And
the precise positions of the individual members of the Court are
not certain. However, because of the strong recognition of the
right by Richmond, future questions of the scope of access must be
met with careful examination and a balancing of interests rather
than flat denial.
It must be emphasized that the public right of access is by no
means absolute. After the existence of the right had been denied
for so long, the Richmond Court was not about to turn around and
recognize a broad right which would subject all governmental in-
stitutions and information to public access. As demonstrated by
the primary theories offered in Richmond,8 5 the Court's attitude
toward the right in the future undoubtedly will be one of controlled
development. Nevertheless, although the right of access will be
controlled, it is unlikely that its scope will be limited to the status
quo interpretation offered by the Chief Justice.186 The potential of
the right is simply too powerful and far-reaching to be limited to
maintaining things as they are.
Without a doubt, one of the first questions presented will be
whether the public has a first amendment right of access to pre-
trial suppression hearings.187 At the time Gannett was decided, 88
the majority of the Court had not recognized the first amendment
right of access. 89 Therefore, it could be argued that as a result of
Richmond a judge now will be required to weigh the first amend-
ment public right of access before closing pretrial proceedings to
the public and press. It is unlikely that such closures will be al-
lowed without some justification. The real question is how much?
V. CONCLUSION
The Richmond Court should be applauded for its recognition of
a first amendment right of public access. It is a right too long de-
nied the people of a self-governed nation. However, in its recogni-
184. In Richmond, seven members of the Court recognized a right of access. How-
ever, Justice Powell, who did not participate in the Richmond decision, had
previously recognized the right in Saxbe, Pel Houchins and Gannett. See
§ fIf-B & -C of text supra.
185. See § IV-B of text supra.
186. See note 171 & accompanying text supra.
187. In Richmond, Justice Stewart recognized this question, but declined to com-
ment further. 100 S. Ct. at 2841 (Stewart, J., concurring).
188. See § Ill-C of text supra.
189. Justice Powell was the only member of the Court to recognize a first amend-
ment right of access in Gannett. See notes 105-06 & accompanying text supra.
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tion of the new right, the Court failed to satisfactorily answer the
narrower question of the requirements and standards for the right
of access to criminal trials. The multitude of opinions will un-
doubtedly leave the lower courts in a state of confusion and re-
quire them to decide the issue again and again.
Such a divergence of theory and rationale has been the norm in
the Court's fair trial-free press and access decisions. Certainly,
wide-open debate and differences of opinion are at the core of the
first amendment. However, the highest Court in the land has a re-
sponsibility to decide constitutional questions in a manner which
produces relatively firm and understandable results.
The Richmond decision is the product of a fractionalized Court,
which, either because of unreconcilable differences or philosophi-
cal rigidity, was unable to agree upon a clear and workable stan-
dard. Regardless of the reason for the ambiguity in Richmond,
there is more than a little truth in Justice Rehnquist's dissent,
where he quoted the Lord Chancellor in the Gilbert & Sullivan ope-
retta, Iolanthe: "The Law is the true embodiment of everything
that's excellent. It has no kind of fault or flaw. And I, my lords,
embody the law."1 9 0
Robert F. Copple '81
190. 100 S. Ct. at 2843 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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